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Abstract. The concept of Ephemerizer, proposed by Perlman, is a crypto-
graphic primitive for assureddatadeletion.With anEphemerizer protocol,
data inpersistent storagedeviceswill always be encrypted simultaneously
using an ephemeral public key of the Ephemerizer (an entity which will
publish a set of ephemeral public keys and periodically delete the expired
ones) and the long-term public key of a user. An Ephemerizer protocol en-
ables the user to securely decrypt the encrypted data without leaking any
information to the Ephemerizer. So far, no security model has ever been
proposed for this primitive and existing protocols have not been stud-
ied formally. Not surprisingly, we show that some existing Ephemerizer
protocols possess security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce the
notion of Timed-Ephemerizer, which can be regarded as a hybrid prim-
itive by combining Ephemerizer and Timed-Release Encryption. Com-
pared with an Ephemerizer protocol, a Timed-Ephemerizer protocol fur-
ther guarantees that data will only be released after a pre-defined disclo-
sure time.Moreover, we propose a securitymodel for Timed-Ephemerizer
and formalize relevant security properties.We also propose a new Timed-
Ephemerizer protocol and prove its security in the security model.
Keywords: Ephemerizer, storage, privacy, assured lifecycle, cloud com-
puting
1 Introduction
Rapid growth of information technology has greatly facilitated individuals and
enterprizes to generate and store sensitive data (business transaction details,
electronic health records, personal profiles, etc.). It is common that backups
of the same piece of data will be placed on many different persistent storage
devices, such as harddisks, tapes, andUSB tokens. To protect the confidentiality,
sensitive data are often firstly encrypted then stored on various devices, while
the cryptographic keys also need to be stored and backuped on some persistent
storage devices. With respect to storing data in persistent storage devices, there
are two concerns.
? This is an extended version of the paper, titled ”Timed-Ephemerizer: Make Assured
Data Appear and Disappear”, which has appeared on EUROPKI 2009.
1. It is relatively easy to recover data from persistent storage devices, even
when the data has been deleted. As such, the US government specification
has suggested to overwrite non-classified information three times [12]. In
contrast to persistent storage devices, it is more difficult for an adversary to
corrupt volatile storage devices (for example,most forms ofmodern random
access memory) because the data in such devices will disappear when the
electricity/power is gone. However, it is worth noting that this could be very
subtle in the presence of side channel attacks, especially when considering
the cold boot attacks [7].
2. Backups of encrypted sensitive data and cryptographic keys often reside
in many devices. Consequently, it is difficult to guarantee that all relevant
backups have been deleted.
The above observations imply that an adversary may simultaneously obtain a
copy of encrypted data and relevant cryptographic keys due to the potential
management carelessness. Especially, this may be fairly easy for a malicious
insider in organizations. To reduce the potential risks facing sensitive data, it is
crucial to define an expiration time and strictly enforce secure deletion (includ-
ing the backupedversions) afterwards. Subsequently, an effective cryptographic
protocol is needed for the enforcement.
Ephemerizer, proposed by Perlman [14,15] and further studied by Nair et
al. [10], has shown a promising direction towards a practical solution to the
above problem. At the core of Ephemerizer is a key management service pro-
vided by an entity, referred to as the Ephemerizer, which will publish a set of
ephemeral public keys and securely delete the expired ones periodically. With
an Ephemerizer protocol, data in persistent storage devices will always be en-
crypted simultaneously using an ephemeral public key of the Ephemerizer and
the long-term public key of a user. The novelty of a secure Ephemerizer protocol
is that it enables the user to securely decrypt the encrypted data without leak-
ing any information to the Ephemerizer. If we assume that the plaintext data
only reside in volatile storage devices such as memory, then an Ephemerizer
protocol guarantees that expired data will remain even if the user’s persistent
storage, the user’s long-term private key, and the unexpired private keys of the
Ephemerizer have been compromised.
1.1 Problem Statement
So far, no security model has ever been proposed for Ephemerizer and existing
protocols have not been analyzed formally. As a result, even if an existing
Ephemerizer protocol is employed, it is not clearwhat kindof security guarantee
will be provided. To gain confidence in these protocols, we need to propose a
formal security model and conduct corresponding security analysis.
The other concern is that an Ephemerizer protocol is only supposed to pro-
vide assured deletion but not assured initial disclosure, which however could
be a very useful feature in some practical applications. In a security guideline
published by the Cloud Security Alliance1, thirteen domains of interest have
been identified for applications in the cloud computing environment, one of
which is information lifecycle management. As such, protocols providing assured
lifecycle (marked by an assured initial disclosure and an assured deletion) will
be more appealing than those providing only assure deletion. We illustrate this
by an outsourcing data security example in Section 6.2.
1.2 Our Contribution
We first show that some Ephemerizer protocols in [10,14,15] possess security
vulnerabilities. Specifically, we show that the Ephemerizer protocol using blind
decryption technique in [14,15] is vulnerable to attacks from a curious Ephemer-
izer. More seriously, we show that the hybrid PKI-IBC Ephemerizer protocol in
[10] does not achieve assured deletion, i.e. an adversary can recover expired
data.
As an augment to Ephemerizer, we introduce and formalize the concept
of Timed-Ephemerizer, which provides an assured lifecycle for sensitive data.
In essence, Timed-Ephemerizer can be regarded as a hybrid primitive from
Ephemerizer [14,15] and Timed-Release Encryption [9], which are surveyed
in Section 2. With a Timed-Ephemerizer protocol, data in persistent storage
devices will always be encrypted simultaneously using an ephemeral public
key of the Ephemerizer, the long-term public key of a user, and the long-term
public key of the time server (which will publish timestamps periodically). A
Timed-Ephemerizer protocol enables the user to securely decrypt the encrypted
data only during a pre-defined time slot, yet without leaking any information
to the Ephemerizer and the time server.
Timed-Ephemerizer is an incremental primitive based on Ephemerizer, by
adding the time server to enforce the assured initial disclosure property. If
the time server’s private key is made public (or, the assured initial disclosure
property is disabled), then Timed-Ephemerizer becomes Ephemerizer. Corre-
spondingly, a security model for Ephemerizer can be obtained simply by giving
the time server’s private key to the adversary in the attack games in the security
model for Timed-Ephemerizer. It is feasible to construct a Timed-Ephemerizer
protocol by composing an Ephemerizer protocol and a Timed-Release Encryp-
tion protocol. However, a construction from scratch may significantly improve
the efficiency.
We propose a new Timed-Ephemerizer protocol and prove its security in the
proposed security model. As an application, we show that Timed-Ephemerizer
is exactly the tool for users to enforce information lifecycle management in
outsourcing activities.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the
relevant works on Ephemerizer and Timed-Release Encryption. In Section 3 we
1 http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/
show that some existing Ephemerizer protocols possess security vulnerabilities.
In Section 4 we introduce the concept of Timed-Ephemerizer and formalize the
security properties. In Section 5we propose a new Timed-Ephemerizer protocol
and prove its security. In Section 6, we present some further remarks on Timed-
Ephemerizer. In Section 7 we conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
In this sectionwe first briefly review some relevantworks that focus on securely
deleting expired sensitive data. We then briefly review the concept of Timed-
Release Encryption.
2.1 Ephemerizer and Similar Protocols
Perlman [14,15] proposed two Ephemerizer protocols without providing rigor-
ous security proofs. One protocol uses a blind decryption technique. The other
protocol uses a triple encryption technique, where data is encrypted using a
symmetric key which is sequentially encrypted using the public key of the user,
the public key of the Ephemerizer, and the public key of the user. Nair et al. [10]
has shown that the second protocol is vulnerable to attacks. In addition, Nair
et al. [10] observed that both protocols proposed by Perlman do not provide
support for fine-grained user settings on the lifetime of the data. As a solution,
Nair et al. proposed an Ephemerizer protocol using identity-based public-key
encryption [2,18]. However, they have not provided any security analysis in
a formal security model. In Section 3 we show that both the first protocol by
Perlman and the protocol by Nair et al. are vulnerable to attacks.
Recently, Geambasu et al. [6] introduced the concept ofVanish for the purpose
of the self-destruction of sensitive data, which utilizes the dynamic nature of
P2P networks where peer nodes dynamically join and leave the network. With
Vanish, sensitive data is encrypted using a symmetric key, which is then divided
into a number of shares using Shamir’s secret sharing technique [18]. The key
shares are distributed into a set of nodes (randomly chosen) in a P2P network,
and the symmetric key becomes unrecoverable when a subset of a P2P nodes
leave the network. Compared with Ephemerizer and Timed-Ephemerizer, Van-
ish cannot provide a precisely defined expiration time. In Section 6.1,we provide
a detailed comparison between them.
2.2 Timed-Release Encryption
The concept of Timed-Release Encryption (TRE), i.e. sending a message which
can only be decrypted after a pre-defined release time, is attributed to May [9].
Later on, Rivest, Shamir, andWagner further elaborate on this concept and gave
a number of its applications including electronic auctions, key escrow, chess
moves, release of documents over time, payment schedules, press releases [17].
Hwang, Yum, and Lee [8] extend the concept of TRE schemes to include the
Pre-Open Capability which allows the message sender to assist the receiver to
decrypt the ciphertext before the pre-defineddisclosure time. Later on, Dent and
Tang [5] propose a refinedmodel and comprehensive analysis for this extended
primitive.
There are two approaches to embed a timestamp in a ciphertext. One ap-
proach, proposed in [17], is that a secret is transformed in such a way that all
kinds of machines (serial or parallel) take at least a certain amount of time to
solve the underlying computational problems (puzzle) in order to recover the
secret. The release time is equal to the time at which the puzzle is released plus
the minimum amount of time that it would take to solve the puzzle. However,
this means that not all users are capable of decrypting the ciphertext at the re-
lease time as they may have different computing power. The other approach is
to use a trusted time server, which, at an appointed time, will assist in releasing
a secret to help decrypt the ciphertext (e.g. [3,17]). Using this approach, the
underlying schemes require interaction between the server and the users, and
should prevent possible malicious behaviour of the time server. In this paper,
we will adopt the second approach because, regardless of the computing power
of all involved entities, it canprovide assureddisclosure time under appropriate
assumptions.
3 Review of Existing Ephemerizer Protocols
In this section we point out some vulnerabilities of the Ephemerizer protocol
which uses the blind decryption technique in [14,15] and the hybrid PKI-IBC
Ephemerizer protocol in [10].
3.1 Ephemerizer Protocol using Blind Decryption
Description of the Protocol The Ephemerizer protocol using blind decryp-
tion [14,15] involves the following types of entities: users and an Ephemerizer.
The idea of this design is quite simple. Data is encrypted using a symmetric
key, which will be double-encrypted using the ephemeral public key of the
Ephemerizer and the public key of the user.
– SetupE(`): The Ephemerizer generates a set of tuples
(KeyIDtephj ,PKtephj , SKtephj , teph j),
where KeyIDtephj is the identifier of this tuple, (PKtephj , SKtephj ) is a key pair of a
public key encryption schemeE1with the encryption/decryption algorithms
(Encrypt1,Decrypt1), and teph j is the expiration time.
– SetupU(`):Auser generates a keypair (PKU, SKU) for a public key encryption
scheme E2 with the encryption/decryption algorithms (Encrypt2,Decrypt2).
The user also selects a symmetric key encryption scheme
E0 = (Encrypt0,Decrypt0),
which will be used to encrypt data in the system.
– Generate(M,PKU,PKtephj ): The ciphertext is (KeyIDtephj ,C,PKtephj ), where
Cm = Encrypt0(M,K), Ck = Encrypt1(K,PKtephj ),
Ctephj = Encrypt2(Ck,PKU), C = (Cm,Ctephj ).
– Retrieve(C, SKU; SKtephj ):
1. Theuser generates an ephemeral functionpair (Blind,Unblind) satisfying
the the following homomorphic property:
K = Unblind(Decrypt1(Blind(Ck), SKtephj )).
2. The user then decrypts Ctephj to obtain Ck, and then computes and sends
(KeyIDtephj ,C
′
tephj
) to the Ephemerizer, where
C′tephj
= Blind(Ck).
3. If the ephemeral key SKtephj associated with KeyIDtephj has not expired,
the Ephemerizer decrypts C′tephj
and sends C
′′
tephj
to the user, where
C
′′
tephj
= Decrypt1(C′tephj , SKtephj )
= Decrypt1(Blind(Ck), SKtephj ).
4. The user obtainsM as follows
K = Unblind(C′′tephj ), M = Decrypt0(Cm,K).
With respect to the efficiency, this protocol may be quite inefficient in prac-
tice. The main reason is that the Ephemerizer potentially needs to publish and
certify all the ephemeral public keys before data can be encrypted by the user.
Considering the fact that the data may have a wide range of expiration time,
the Ephemerizer may need to publish a large volume of key pairs.
Security Analysis of the Protocol In [14,15], the following assumptions are
made on the validation of public keys.
1. The user should validate that the empemeral public keys PKtephj is certified
by a long-term private key of the Ephemerizer, where the corresponding
long-term public key is certified by a Trusted Third Party (TTP).
2. There is no need for the Ephemerizer and the user to authenticate each other.
There is no need to encrypt or integrity protect the ephemeral key sent to
the user, i.e. there is no need for the user to check the validity of PKtephj in
any received message (KeyIDtephj ,C,PKtephj ).
We show below that lacking of validation of PKtephj by the user may lead to
a potential security vulnerability if the Ephemerizer is curious. As one of the
options suggested in [14,15], we suppose that the public key encryption scheme
E1 is RSA [17]. Then, the above Ephemerizer protocol will be instantiated to be
the following.
– SetupE(`): The Ephemerizer generates (PKtephj , SKtephj ) in the form ((e j,N j), d j)
where e jd j ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(N j)).
– SetupU(`): The algorithm is the same as in the above.
– Generate(M,PKU,PKtephj ): The ciphertext is (KeyIDtephj ,C, (e j,N j)), where C =
(Cm,Ctephj ),
Cm = Encrypt0(M,K), Ck = Ke j mod N j, Ctephj = Encrypt2(Ck,PKU).
– Retrieve(C, SKU; SKtephj ):
1. The user generates R ∈R Z∗N j
2. The user decrypts Ctephj to obtain Ck = K
e j mod N j, and then computes
and sends (KeyIDtephj ,C
′
tephj
) to the Ephemerizer, where
R ∈R Z
∗
N, C
′
tephj
= Ke jRe j mod N j. (1)
3. If the ephemeral key SKtephj associated with KeyIDtephj has not expired,
the Ephemerizer decrypts C′tephj
and sends C
′′
tephj
to the user, where
C
′′
tephj
= (C′tephj
)d j mod N j
= (Ke jRe j )d j mod N j
= KR mod N j.
4. The user obtain K = C
′′
tephj
R−1 mod N j, and then decrypts Cm to obtain
M = Decrypt0(Cm,K).
Suppose the Ephemerizer has obtained (KeyIDtephj ,C, (e j,N j)) by eavesdrop-
ping on the user’s communications. In order to recover the key K, the Ephemer-
izer can send (KeyIDtephj ,C, (ϕ(N j),N j)) to the user. Note that the Ephemer-
izer knows ϕ(N j). According to the Retrieve algorithm, the user will send
(KeyIDtephj ,C
′
tephj
), where
C′tephj
= Ke jRϕ(N j) mod N j
= Ke j mod N j,
to the Ephemerizer for blind decryption. Clearly, the Ephemerizer can obtain
K = (C′tephj
)d j mod N j.
Due to the fact that the ephemeral public key is only required to be certified
by the private key of the Ephemerizer, the presented security vulnerability will
still remain even if the user validates the public keys in the ciphertext. One
possible solution is that the ephemeral public keys of Ephemerizer should be
directly certified by a TTP.
3.2 The Hybrid PKI-IBC Ephemerizer Protocol
Description of the Protocol The hybrid PKI-IBC Ephemerizer protocol [10]
also involves the following types of entities: users and an Ephemerizer. The
algorithms are defined as follows.
– SetupE(`): The Ephemerizer generates a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2, a
generator P ∈R G1, a long-term private key SKE ∈R Zp and the public key
PKE = SKEP, two hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n,
and a set of ephemeral tuples (KeyIDtephj ,PKtephj , SKtephj , texp j) where KeyIDtephj
is the identifier of this tuple, teph j is the expiration time, and PKtephj = SKtephjP.
Suppose that G1 is additive and GT is multiplicative. Suppose also that the
Ephemerizer possesses the identity IDE.
– SetupU(`): The user generates a key pair (PKU, SKU) for a public key encryp-
tion schemeE2with the encryption/decryptionalgorithms (Encrypt2,Decrypt2).
The user also selects a symmetric key encryption scheme
E1 = (Encrypt1,Decrypt1),
which will be used to encrypt data in the system.
– Generate(M,PKU,PKtephj ): The ciphertext is (KeyIDtephj ,C), where r ∈R Zp,
Cm = Encrypt1(M,K), Ck = Encrypt2(K,PKU), (2)
IDtephj = IDE||Expiry : t
′
exp j , Qtephj = eˆ(H1(IDtephj ),PKtephj ),
Ctephj = (rP,Ck ⊕ H2((Qtephj )
r)), (3)
C†tephj
= Encrypt2(IDtephj ||Ctephj ,PKU), C = (Cm,C
†
tephj
). (4)
It is required t′exp j should be smaller than texp j which is the expiration time of
(PKtephj , SKtephj ).
– Retrieve(C, SKU; SKtephj , SKE):
1. The user first decryptsC†tephj
to obtain IDtephj andCtephj , and then computes
and sends (KeyIDtephj , ID
′
tephj
,C′tephj
) to the Ephemerizer, where
ID′tephj
∈R {0, 1}
∗, Q′tephj
= eˆ(H1(ID′tephj ),PKE),
r′ ∈R Zp, C
′
tephj
= (r′P, (IDtephj ||K
′) ⊕ H2((Q′tephj )
r′)). (5)
2. If the ephemeral key SKtephj associated with KeyIDtephj has not expired,
the Ephemerizer decrypts C′tephj
to obtain IDtephj and K
′ as follows
IDtephj ||K
′ = (IDtephj ||K
′) ⊕ H2((Q′tephj )
r′)⊕
H2(eˆ(H1(ID′tephj ), r
′P)SKE).
(6)
It then computes and sends C
′′
tephj
to the user, where
C
′′
tephj
= Encrypt1(SKtephj H1(IDtephj ),K
′). (7)
3. The user decryptsC
′′
tephj
to obtain SKtephj H1(IDtephj ), and then decryptsCtephj
to obtain Ck as follows
Ck = Ck ⊕ H2((Qtephj )
r) ⊕ H2(eˆ(rP, SKtephj H1(IDtephj ))). (8)
The user then sequentially decrypts Ck and Cm to obtainM as follows:
K = Decrypt2(Ck, SKU), M = Decrypt1(Cm,K). (9)
Security Analysis of the Protocol
On the exact expiration time. In the above protocol, when the entity, who runs
Generate, constructs IDtephj = IDE||Expiry : t
′
exp j
, it chooses an ephemeral public
key PKtephj where t
′
exp j
< texp j . This means that, at the time between t
′
exp j
and texp j , if
an adversary compromises both the Ephemerizer and the user, then it is able to
recoverM. This observation implies that the expiration time for the ciphertext
C is in fact texp j instead of t
′
exp j
.
On recovering expired data. In [10], no rigorous analysis has been done for
this protocol. Next, we show that expired data can still be recovered by an
adversary. Suppose that, through eavesdropping, the adversary has obtained
(C,C′tephj
,C
′′
tephj
), where
C = (Cm,C
†
tephj
), Cm = Encrypt1(M,K), C†tephj = Encrypt2(IDtephj ||Ctephj , PKU),
C′tephj
= (r′P, (IDtephj ||K
′) ⊕H2((Q′tephj )
r′)), C
′′
tephj
= Encrypt1(SKtephj H1(IDtephj ),K
′).
Suppose that, at the time teph j+1 , where teph j+1 > teph j
2, the adversary compromises
the Ephemerizer and the user, and obtains SKE and SKU.
1. Based on the equation (5), using SKE, the adversary can decrypt C′tephj
and
obtain IDtephj ||K
′.
2. Basedon the equation (7), usingK′, the adversary can recoverSKtephj H1(IDtephj )
by decrypting C
′′
tephj
.
3. Based on the equation (4), using SKU, the adversary can recover Ctephj by
decrypting C.
4. Based on the equation (3), using SKtephj H1(IDtephj ), the adversary can recover
Ck by decrypting Ctephj .
5. Based on the equations (2), using SKU, the adversary can recover K by
decrypting Ck, and then recoverM by decrypting Cm using K.
4 The Concept of Timed-Ephemerizer
In this section,we introduce the concept of Timed-Ephemerizer and formalize its
security properties. As Ephemerizer protocols (instead of Timed-Ephemerizer
protocols) may need to be analyzed as well, we also provide a formalization for
Ephemerizer for the convenience.
4.1 The Algorithm Definitions
Informally, a Timed-Ephemerizer protocol guarantees that data will only be
available during a pre-defined lifecycle, beyond which no adversary can re-
cover the data even if it has compromised all existing private keys in the sys-
tem. Compared with Ephemerizer protocols [10,14,15], a Timed-Ephemerizer
protocol explicitly provides the guarantee that data can only be available after
the pre-defined initial disclosure time.
Generally, a Timed-Ephemerizer protocol involves the following types of
entities: a time server, users, and an Ephemerizer.
– Time server, which will publish timestamps periodically. We assume that
the time server acts properly in generating its parameters and publishing
the timestamps.
– User, which will access the data during its lifecycle.
– Ephemerizer,which is trusted topublishand revokeephemeralpublic/private
key pairs periodically.
2 At the time teph j+1 , SKtephj
has been securely deleted and any ciphertext encrypted with PKtephj
should be unrecoverable.
Comparedwith anEphemerizer protocol, a Timed-Ephemerizer protocol has
one additional entity, namely the time server.Onemay have the observation that
the Ephemerizer can be required to release timestamps so that the time server
can be eliminated. However, we argue that the separation of functionalities
provides a higher level of security in general. First of all, the time server only
needs to publish timestamps without any additional interaction with other
entities. In practice, the risk that time server is compromised is less than that
for the Ephemerizer. Secondly, the risk that both the Ephemerizer and the time
server are compromised is less than that any of them is compromised.
A Timed-Ephemerizer protocol consists of the following polynomial-time
algorithms. Let ` be the security parameter.
– SetupT(`): Run by the time server, this algorithm generates a public/private
key pair (PKT, SKT).
– TimeExt(t, SKT): Run by the time server, this algorithm generates a times-
tamp TSt. It is assumed that the time server publishes TSt at the point t.
Throughout the paper, the notation t < t′ means t is earlier than t′.
– SetupE(`): Run by the Ephemerizer, this algorithm generates a set of tuples
(PKtephj , SKtephj , teph j) for j ≥ 1, where (PKtephj , SKtephj ) is an ephemeral pub-
lic/private key pair and teph j is the expiration time. The Ephemerizer will
securely delete SKtephj at the point teph j . We assume that there is only one
ephemeral key pair for any expiration time teph j . In addition, we assume
teph j < tephk if j < k.
– SetupU(`): Run by a user, this algorithm generates a public/private key pair
(PKU, SKU).
– Generate(M, tint,PKU,PKtephj ,PKT): This algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
For the messageM, tint is the initial disclosure time and teph j is the expiration
time. We explicitly assume that both (tint, teph j) and C should be sent to the
user.
– Retrieve(C,TStint , SKU; SKtephj ): Interactively runbetweenauser and theEphemer-
izer, this algorithm outputs a plaintextM or an error symbol for the user.
In the algorithm definitions, besides the explicitly specified parameters,
other public parameters could also be specified and be implicitly part of the
input. We omit those parameters for the simplicity of description.
Remark 1. A Timed-Ephemerizer protocol can be employed by an entity, say
Alice, to protect her own data in persistent storage devices or protect her data
that she wants to share with another entity, say Bob. In the first situation, Alice
encrypts her dataGenerate(M, tint,PKA,PKtephj ,PKT), where PKA is Alice’s public
key. In the secondsituation,Alice encryptsherdataGenerate(M, tint,PKB,PKtephj ,PKT),
where PKB is Bob’s public key. The example in Section 6.2 is in the second situ-
ation.
4.2 The Security Definitions
We first describe some conventions for writing probabilistic algorithms and ex-
periments. The notation u ∈R Smeans u is randomly chosen from the set S. IfA
is a probabilistic algorithm, then v
$
←A(f1 ,f2,··· )(x, y, · · · ) means that v is the result
of running A, which takes x, y, · · · as input and has any polynomial number
of oracle queries to the functions f1, f2, · · · . As a standard practice, the security
of a protocol is evaluated by an experiment between an attacker and a chal-
lenger, where the challenger simulates the protocol executions and answers the
attacker’s oracle queries. Without specification, algorithms are always assumed
to be polynomial-time.
A Timed-Ephemerizer protocol is aimed to guarantee that data will only
be available during its lifecycle, while neither before the initial disclosure time
nor after the expiration time. We assume that the validation of public keys in
the protocol can be verified by all the participants. Nonetheless, we generally
assume that an outside adversary is active, which means that the adversary
may compromise the protocol participants and fully control the communica-
tion channels (i.e. capable of deleting, relaying, and replacing the messages
exchanged between the participants). Considering the threats against confiden-
tiality of data, we identify three categories of adversaries.
– Type-I adversary: This type of adversary wants to access data before its
initial disclosure time. Type-I adversary represents a curious user and also a
malicious outside entity which has compromised the Ephemerizer and the
user before the initial disclosure time of the data.
– Type-II adversary: This type of adversary wants to access data after its
expiration time. Type-II adversary represents a malicious outside entity
which has compromised the time server, the Ephemerizer, and the user
after the expiration time of the data.
– Type-III adversary: This type of adversary represents a curious time server
and a curious Ephemerizer, and also a malicious outside entity which has
compromised the time server and the Ephemerizer.
The implications of a Type-I adversary and a Type-II adversary are clear for a
Timed-Ephemerizer protocol. Nonetheless, the existence of a Type-III adversary
still makes sense even in the presence of these two types of adversary.Compared
with a Type-I adversary, a Type-III adversary has the advantage of accessing
the private key (and all timestamps) of the time server; while compared with
a Type-II adversary, a Type-III adversary has the advantage of accessing all the
private keys of the Ephemerizer. However, a Type-III adversary does not have
direct access to the user’s private key.
Remark 2. It is worth stressing that when the adversary compromises an entity
(the time server, the Ephemerizer, or the user) it will obtain the private keys
possessed by that entity. For example, if the Ephemerizer is compromised at the
point t, then it will obtain all the private keys SKtephj for teph j > t. However, we
do not take into account the compromise of ephemeral session secrets during
the executions of algorithms.
Definition 1. A Timed-Ephemerizer protocol achieves Type-I semantic security if any
polynomial-time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the following semantic
security game (as shown in Figure 1), where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ =
b] − 12 |.
1. (PKT ,SKT)
$
← SetupT(`); (PKtephj ,SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1
$
← SetupE(`); (PKU ,SKU)
$
← SetupU(`)
2. (M0,M1, t
∗
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,PKtephi
)
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←A(TimeExt)(SKtephj
for j ≥ 1,SKU)
3. b
$
← {0, 1};Cb
$
← Generate(Mb , t∗int,PKU ,PKtephi ,PKT)
4. b′
$
←A(TimeExt)(Cb ,SKtephj
for j ≥ 1,SKU)
Fig. 1. Semantic Security against Type-I Adversary
In more detail, the attack game between the challenger and the adversaryA
performs as follows. In this game the challenger simulates the functionality of
the time server.
1. The challenger runs SetupT to generate (PKT, SKT), runs SetupE to generate
(PKtephj , SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1, and runs SetupU to generate (PKU, SKU). Except for
SKT , all private keys and all public parameters are given to the adversary.
2. The adversary can adaptively query the TimeExt oracle, for which the ad-
versary provides a time t and gets a timestamp TSt from the challenger. At
some point, the adversary sends the challenger two equal-length plaintext
M0,M1 on which it wishes to be challenged, and two timestamps (t
∗
int
, tephi).
The only restriction is that the TimeExt oracle should not have been queried
with t ≥ t∗
int
.
3. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary Cb as
the challenge, where
Cb = Generate(Mb, t∗int,PKU,PKtephi ,PKT).
4. The adversary can continue to query the TimeExt oracle with the same
restriction as in Step 2.
5. Eventually, the adversary outputs b′.
In the above attack game, the adversary is Type-I because it has access to
SKU and SKtephj for any j ≥ 1
Remark 3. The restriction in steps 2 and 4 of the above game, namely “the
TimeExt oracle should not have been queried with t ≥ t∗
int
.”, implies that the
adversary tries to recover a message before the initial disclosure time. This
coincides with the definition of Type-I adversary.
Definition 2. ATimed-Ephemerizer protocol achieves Type-II semantic security if any
polynomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the following semantic
security game (as shown in Figure 2), where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ =
b] − 12 |.
1. (PKT ,SKT)
$
← SetupT(`); (PKtephj ,SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1
$
← SetupE(`); (PKU ,SKU)
$
← SetupU(`)
2. (M0,M1, t
∗
int
,PKtephi
)
$
←A(Retrieve)(SKT , SKtephj
for j > i, SKU)
3. b
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← {0, 1};Cb
$
← Generate(Mb , t∗int,PKU ,PKtephi ,PKT)
4. b′
$
←A(Retrieve)(Cb, SKT ,SKtephj
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Fig. 2. Semantic Security against Type-II Adversary
In more detail, the attack game between the challenger and the adversaryA
performs as follows. In this game the challenger simulates the functionalities of
both the Ephemerizer and the user.
1. The challenger runs SetupT to generate (PKT, SKT), runs SetupE to generate
(PKtephj , SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1, and runsSetupU to generate (PKU, SKU). The private
key SKT and all public parameters are given to the adversary.
2. The adversary can adaptively issue the following two types of Retrieve
oracle queries.
(a) D-type Retrieve oracle query: In each oracle query, the adversary imper-
sonates the Ephemerizer and provides (tint, teph j) andC to the challenger,
which then uses (C,TStint , SKU) as input and runs the Retrieve algorithm
with the adversary to decrypt C by assuming that the initial disclosure
time is tint and the expiration time is teph j .
(b) E-type Retrieve query: In each oracle query, the adversary impersonates
a user to the Ephemerizer and sends teph j to the challenger, which uses
SKtephj as the input and runs the Retrieve algorithm with the adversary.
At some point, the adversary sends the challenger two equal-length plain-
text M0,M1 on which it wishes to be challenged, and two timestamps
(t∗
int
, tephi). In this phase, the adversary can query for SKU and SKtephj for
any j > i with the following restriction: if SKU has been queried, then any
E-type Retrieve oracle query with the input teph j for any j ≤ i is forbidden.
3. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary Cb as
the challenge, where
Cb = Generate(Mb, t∗int,PKU,PKtephi ,PKT).
4. The adversary can continue to issue oracle queries as in Step 2with the same
restriction.
5. The adversaryA outputs b′.
In the above attack game, the adversary is Type-II because it has access to
the private keys SKT, SKU, and SKtephj for any j > i.
Remark 4. In the above game, the privilege, that the adversary can issue the two
types ofRetrieve oracle queries, reflects the fact that the adversary has complete
control over the communication link between the user and the Ephemerizer.
In practice, such an adversary can initiate the Retrieve algorithm with both
the Ephemerizer and the user. The first case is modeled by the E-type Retrieve
query, while the second case is modeled by the D-type Retrieve query.
Remark 5. The restriction in the above game, namely “if SKU has been queried,
then E-typeRetrieve oracle query with the input teph j for any j ≤ i is forbidden.”,
reflects the fact that the adversary tries to recover a message after its expiration
time tephi (when the ephemeral keys SKtephj for any j ≤ i should have been
securely deleted by the Ephemerizer). This coincides with the definition of
Type-II adversary.
Definition 3. ATimed-Ephemerizer protocol achieves Type-III semantic security if any
polynomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the following semantic
security game (as shown in Figure 3), where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ =
b] − 12 |.
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Fig. 3. Semantic Security against Type-III Adversary
In more detail, the attack game between the challenger and the adversaryA
performs as the following. In this game the challenger simulates the function-
ality of the user.
1. The challenger runs SetupT to generate (PKT, SKT), runs SetupE to generate
(PKtephj , SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1, and runsSetupU to generate (PKU, SKU). The private
keySKT, all ephemeral private keysSKtephj for j ≥ 1, and all public parameters
are given to the adversary.
2. The adversary can adaptively issue the D-type Retrieve oracle query (de-
fined as above). At some point, the adversary sends the challenger two
equal-length plaintextM0,M1 on which it wishes to be challenged, and two
timestamps (t∗
int
, tephi).
3. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary Cb as
the challenge, where
Cb = Generate(Mb, t∗int,PKU,PKtephi ,PKT).
4. The adversary can continue to query the Retrieve oracle as in Step 2.
5. The adversaryA outputs b′.
In the above attack game, the adversary is Type-III because it has access to
the private keys SKT and SKtephj for any j ≥ 1.
Remark 6. In the above game, expect for the user’s private key, the adversary
is allowed to access all other secrets. In particular, this means that an outside
adversary can compromise both the time server and the Ephemerizer at any
time. This coincides with the definition of Type-III adversary.
4.3 Security Model for Ephemerizer
Formally, an Ephemerizer protocol involves the two types of entities: users and
an Ephemerizer, and consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms.
– Setup′E and Setup′U: they are identical to SetupE and SetupU for Timed-
Ephemerizer, respectively.
– Generate′(M,PKU,PKtephj ): This algorithm outputs a ciphertext C. For the
message M, teph j is the expiration time. We explicitly assume that both teph j
and C should be sent to the user.
– Retrieve′(C, SKU; SKtephj ): Interactively run between a user and the Ephemer-
izer, this algorithm outputs a plaintextM or an error symbol for the user.
With respect to Ephemerizer protocols, we distinguish the following two
types of adversaries.
– Outsider security: This type of adversary wants to access data after its expi-
ration time. It represents amalicious outside entity which has compromised
the Ephemerizer and the user after the expiration time of the data.
– Insider security: This type of adversary represents a curious Ephemerizer.
Definition 4. An Ephemerizer protocol achieves outsider semantic security if any
polynomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the following semantic
security game (as shown in Figure 4), where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ =
b] − 12 |.
In more detail, the attack game between the challenger and the adversaryA
performs as follows. In this game the challenger simulates the functionalities of
both the Ephemerizer and the user.
1. The challenger runs SetupE to generate (PKtephj , SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1, and runs
SetupU to generate (PKU, SKU). All public parameters are given to the ad-
versary.
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,SKtephj
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Fig. 4. Semantic Security against Outsider Adversary
2. The adversary can adaptively issue the following two types of Retrieve
oracle queries.
(a) D-type Retrieve oracle query: In each oracle query, the adversary im-
personates the Ephemerizer and provides teph j and C to the challenger,
which then uses (C, SKU) as input and runs the Retrieve algorithm with
the adversary to decrypt C by assuming that the expiration time is teph j .
(b) E-type Retrieve query: In each oracle query, the adversary impersonates
a user to the Ephemerizer and sends teph j to the challenger, which uses
SKtephj as the input and runs the Retrieve algorithm with the adversary.
At some point, the adversary sends the challenger two equal-length plain-
text M0,M1 on which it wishes to be challenged, and a timestamp tephi . In
this phase, the adversary can query for SKU and SKtephj for any j > i with
the following restriction: if SKU has been queried, then any E-type Retrieve
oracle query with the input teph j for any j ≤ i is forbidden.
3. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary Cb as
the challenge, where
Cb = Generate′(Mb,PKU,PKtephi ).
4. The adversary can continue to issue oracle queries as in Step 2with the same
restriction.
5. The adversaryA outputs b′.
In the above attack game, the adversary is an outsider one because it has
access to the private keys SKU and SKtephj for any j > i.
Definition 5. An Ephemerizer protocol achieves insider semantic security if any poly-
nomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the following semantic security
game (as shown in Figure 5), where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |.
In more detail, the attack game between the challenger and the adversaryA
performs as the following. In this game the challenger simulates the function-
ality of the user.
1. The challenger runs SetupE to generate (PKtephj , SKtephj ) for j ≥ 1, and runs
SetupU to generate (PKU, SKU). All ephemeral private keys SKtephj for j ≥ 1,
and all public parameters are given to the adversary.
1. (PKtephj
,SKtephj
) for j ≥ 1
$
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Fig. 5. Semantic Security against Insider Adversary
2. The adversary can adaptively issue the D-type Retrieve oracle query (de-
fined as above). At some point, the adversary sends the challenger two
equal-length plaintext M0,M1 on which it wishes to be challenged, and a
timestamp tephi .
3. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary Cb as
the challenge, where
Cb = Generate(Mb,PKU,PKtephi ).
4. The adversary can continue to query the Retrieve oracle as in Step 2.
5. The adversaryA outputs b′.
In the above attack game, the adversary is an insider because it has access
to all the private keys SKtephj for any j ≥ 1.
5 A New Timed-Ephemerizer Protocol
5.1 Preliminary of Pairing
We review the necessary knowledge about pairing and the related assumptions.
More detailed information can be found in the seminal paper [2]. A pairing (or,
bilinear map) satisfies the following properties:
1. G and G1 are two multiplicative groups of prime order p;
2. g is a generator of G;
3. eˆ : G×G→ G1 is an efficiently-computable bilinear map with the following
properties:
– Bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have eˆ(ua, vb) = eˆ(u, v)ab.
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) , 1.
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem in G is as follows: given a tuple
g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G as input, output eˆ(g, g)abc ∈ G1. An algorithmA has advantage 
in solving BDH in G if
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc) = eˆ(g, g)abc] ≥ .
Similarly, we say that an algorithm A has advantage  in solving the decision
BDH problem in G if
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)abc) = 0] − Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc,T) = 0]| ≥ .
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Zp, the random
choice of T ∈ G1, and the random bits ofA.
Definition 6. We say that the (decision) (t, )-BDHassumption holds inG if no t-time
algorithm has advantage at least  in solving the (decision) BDH problem in G.
Besides these computational/decisional assumptions, the Knowledge of Ex-
ponent (KE) assumption is also used in a number of papers (e.g. [1,4]). The KE
assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 7. For any adversary A, which takes a KE challenge (g, ga) as input and
returns (C,Y) where Y = Ca, there exists an extractorA′, which takes the same input
asA returns c such that gc = C.
5.2 The Proposed Construction
The general idea. The philosophy behind the proposed protocol is similar to the
blind decryption technique [14,15].
1. Data isfirst encrypted jointlyusing the ephemeralpublic keyof theEphemer-
izer and the public key of the time server.
2. The ciphertext is then re-encrypted using the public key of the user.
To recover the data, the user first decrypts the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain
the ciphertext (under the ephemeral public key of the Ephemerizer and the
public key of the time server), and then sends a re-randomizedversion (with the
XOR (⊕) operation) to the Ephemerizer for decryption. Afterwards, the user can
apply the re-randomization again to the decrypted data from the Ephemerizer
to recover the plaintext data.
The proposal. Let ` be the security parameter and {0, 1}n be the message space of
user, where n is a polynomial in `. The polynomial-time algorithms are defined
as follows.
– SetupT(`): This algorithm generates the following parameters: a multiplica-
tive group G of prime order p, a generator g of G, and a multiplicative
group G1 of the same order as G, a polynomial-time computable bilinear
map eˆ : G × G → G1, a cryptographic hash function H1, and a long-term
public/private key pair (PKT, SKT) where
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, SKT ∈R Zp, PKT = gSKT .
The time server also publishes (G,G1, p, g, eˆ,H1). Suppose that the time
server possesses the identity IDT.
– TimeExt(t, SKT): This algorithm returns TSt = H1(IDT||t)SKT .
– SetupE(`): Suppose that the Ephemerizer possesses the identity IDE. The
Ephemerizer uses the same set of parameter (G,G1, p, g, eˆ) as by the time
server and selects the supported expiration times teph j (1 ≤ j ≤ N) where N
is an integer. The Ephemerizer generates a master key pair (PK(0)
E
, SK
(0)
E
) and
two hash functions H2,H3, where
SK
(0)
E
∈R Zp, PK
(0)
E
= gSK
(0)
E , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H3 : G1 → {0, 1}n,
and sets, for 1 ≤ j ≤ N,
PK
(0)
tephj
= IDE||teph j , SK
(0)
tephj
= H2(IDE||teph j)SK
(0)
E .
The Ephemerizer generates another master key pair (PK(1)
E
, SK
(1)
E
) for an
identity-basedpublic keyencryptionschemeE1 with the encryption/decryption
algorithms (Encrypt1,Decrypt1), and, for 1 ≤ j ≤ N, generates the ephemeral
key pairs
(PK(1)tephj
, SK
(1)
tephj
), where PK(1)tephj
= IDE||teph j .
Suppose the message space and ciphertext space of the encryption scheme
E1 are Y and W, respectively. The Ephemerizer keeps a set of tuples
(PKtephj , SKtephj , teph j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ N, where
PKtephj = (PK
(0)
tephj
,PK
(1)
tephj
), SKtephj = (SK
(0)
tephj
, SK
(1)
tephj
)
Inaddition, theEphemerizerpublishes the long-termpublic keysPK(0)
E
,PK
(1)
E
.
– SetupU(`): This algorithm generates a public/private key pair (PKU, SKU)
for a public key encryption scheme E2 with the encryption/decryption algo-
rithms (Encrypt2,Decrypt2). Suppose the message space of E2 is X and the
ciphertext space isD. The user publishes the following hash functions.
H4 : G ×G→ G, H5 : X → G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n,
H6 : X ×G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n ×D ×G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,
H7 : Y ×G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n ×W ×G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,
H8 : Y ×G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n→ {0, 1}n, H9 : Y → G ×G ×G × {0, 1}n.
– Generate(M, tint,PKU,PKtephj ,PKT): This algorithm outputs a ciphertext C,
where
r1, r2 ∈R Zp, X ∈R X, C1 = g
r1 , C2 = g
r2 , C3 = H4(C1||C2)r1 ,
C4 =M ⊕ H3(eˆ(H2(PK(0)tephj ),PK
(0)
E
)r1 · eˆ(H1(IDT||tint),PKT)r2)
=M ⊕ H3(eˆ(H2(IDE||teph j),C1)SK
(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||tint),C2)SKT ),
C5 = Encrypt2(X,PKU), C6 = H5(X) ⊕ (C1||C2||C3||C4),
C7 = H6(X||C1||C2||C3||C4||C5||C6), C = (C5,C6,C7).
– Retrieve(C,TStint , SKU; SKtephj ):
1. The user decrypts C5 to obtain X, and aborts if the following inequality
is true.
C7 , H6(X||(C6 ⊕ H5(X))||C5||C6)
Otherwise it computes C1||C2||C3||C4 = H5(X) ⊕ C6. The user then com-
putes and sends (C′,TStint) to the Ephemerizer, where
M′ ∈R {0, 1}
n, C′1 = C1, C
′
2 = C2, C
′
3 = C3, C
′
4 =M
′ ⊕ C4,
Y ∈R Y, C
′
5 = Encrypt1(Y,PK
(1)
tephj
), C′6 = H9(Y) ⊕ (C′1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4),
C′7 = H7(Y||C
′
1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4||C
′
5||C
′
6), C
′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7).
2. If the ephemeral keySKtephj = (SK
(0)
tephj
, SK
(1)
tephj
) hasnot expired, theEphemer-
izer decrypts C′
5
to obtain Y, and aborts if
C′7 , H7(Y||(C
′
6 ⊕ H9(Y))||C
′
5||C
′
6).
It then computes C′
1
||C′
2
||C′
3
||C′
4
= H9(Y) ⊕ C′6, and aborts if
eˆ(C′3, g) , eˆ(C
′
1,H4(C
′
1||C
′
2))
Finally, it sends C
′′
to the user, where
C
′′
= H8(Y||C′1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4) ⊕ C
′
4 ⊕ H3(eˆ(C
′
1, SK
(0)
tephj
) · eˆ(TStint ,C
′
2))
= H8(Y||C′1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4) ⊕M
′ ⊕M.
3. The user recoversM = H8(Y||C′1||C
′
2
||C′
3
||C′
4
) ⊕M′ ⊕ C
′′
.
As in the case of the hybrid PKI-IBC protocol [10], the proposed protocol
also adopts the concept of identity-based encryption [2,19]. As a result, the
Ephemerizer avoids publishing a large volume of ephemeral public keys, which
is however the case in [14,15]. Compared with the protocol in [10], the concrete
difference is that the master private key SKE = (SK
(0)
E
, SK
(1)
E
) is only required to
be ephemeral, i.e. after generating the ephemeral private keys, the Ephemerizer
can delete SKE.
Remark 7. In the execution of Retrieve, the timestamp TStint is a required input.
Intuitively, before the time server publishes the timestamp, it is infeasible for
the user and the Ephemerizer to run Retrieve to recover the message. Lemma 1
in the next subsection formalizes this intuition.
5.3 The Security Analysis
The following three lemmas show that the proposed protocol is secure against
all three types of adversaries.
Lemma 1. The proposed scheme achieves semantic security against Type-I adversary
based on the BDH assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary A has the advantage  in the attack game
depicted in Figure 1.
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execu-
tion and answers the oracle queries fromA.We assume the challenger simulates
the hash function H1 as follows. The challenger maintains a list of vectors, each
of them containing a request message, an element of G (the hash-code for this
message), and an element of the form IDT||t. After receiving a request message,
the challenger first checks its list to see whether the request message is already
in the list. If the check succeeds, the challenger returns the stored element of G;
otherwise, the challenger returns gy, where y a randomly chosen element ofZp,
and stores the new vector in the list. Other hash functions are simulated in a
similar way.
On receiving a TimeExt oracle querywith the input t, the challenger answers
PK
y
T
given that H1(IDT||t) = gy. Let δ0 = Pr[b′ = b], as we assumed at the
beginning, |δ0 −
1
2 | = .
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game0
except for the generation of the challenge Cb.
r∗1, r
∗
2 ∈R Zp, X
∗ ∈R X, R ∈ G1, C
∗
1 = g
r∗
1 , C∗2 = g
r∗2 , C∗3 = H4(C
∗
1||C
∗
2)
r∗
1 ,
C∗4 =Mb ⊕ H3(R), C
∗
5 = Encrypt2(X∗,PKU), C∗6 = H5(X∗) ⊕ (C∗1||C∗2||C∗3||C∗4),
C∗7 = H6(X
∗||C∗1||C
∗
2||C
∗
3||C
∗
4||C
∗
5||C
∗
6), Cb = (C
∗
5,C
∗
6,C
∗
7).
Let δ1 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in
Game1. AsR ∈R G1 andH3 is modeled as a randomoracle, the equation |δ1− 12 | =
0 holds.
With respect to the generation of Cb, from Game0 to Game1, the only mod-
ification is that eˆ(H2(IDE||tephi),C∗1)
SK
(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),C
∗
2)
SKT has been replaced
with R, where R ∈R G1. As a result, Game1 is identical to Game0 unless
eˆ(H2(IDE||tephi),C∗1)
SK(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),C
∗
2
)SKT has been queried to H3. Note that
SKT is not required in answering the TimeExt oracle queries. We immediately
obtain |δ1 − δ0| = ′ where ′ is negligible based on the BDH assumption. The
lemma now follows. uunionsq
Lemma 2. The proposed scheme achieves semantic security against Type-II adversary
based on the BDH and the KE assumptions in the random oracle model given that the
public key encryption schemes E1 and E2 are one-way permutation.
Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary A has the advantage  in the attack game
depicted in Figure 2. The security proof is done through a sequence of games
[20].
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol exe-
cution and answers the oracle queries from A. Note that the challenge Cb is
computed as follows.
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∗
5,C
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6,C
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7).
Let δ0 = Pr[b′ = b], as we assumed at the beginning, |δ0 −
1
2 | = .
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game0
except for the following. Before the adversary queries SKU, given a D-type
Retrieve query with the input (C = (C5,C6,C7), tint, teph j), the challenger answers
as the following.
1. In step 4 of the game, if C = Cb, the challenger returns C
′, where
M′ ∈R {0, 1}
n, C′1 = C
∗
1, C
′
2 = C
∗
2, C
′
3 = C
∗
3, C
′
4 =M
′ ⊕ C∗4,
Y ∈R Y, C
′
5 = Encrypt1(Y,PK
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′
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3||C
′
4),
C′7 = H7(Y||C
′
1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4||C
′
5||C
′
6), C
′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7).
2. Otherwise, the challenger first checks whether or not there is a query with
the input
X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6
to the oracle H6 such that
C5 = Encrypt2(X˜,PKU), C6 = C˜6, (10)
H5(X˜) ⊕ C6 = C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4, and C7 = H6(X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6). (11)
If the input exists, the challenger returns C′, where
M′ ∈R {0, 1}
n, C′1 = C˜1, C
′
2 = C˜2, C
′
3 = C˜3, C
′
4 =M
′ ⊕ C˜4,
C′5 = Encrypt1(Y,PK
(1)
tephj
), C′6 = H9(Y) ⊕ (C
′
1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4),
C′7 = H7(Y||C
′
1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4||C
′
5||C
′
6), C
′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7).
Otherwise, the challenger rejects the quest.
The game Game1 is identical to Game0 unless the following event Evn occurs
in answering the D-type Retrieve oracle queries.
– In the second case, there is a query with the input (C = (C5,C6,C7), tint, teph j)
such that an oracle query to H6 with the input X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6 (these
values are determined by the equalities (10) and (11)) returns C7, while the
C7 is chosen before the oracle query is made. Or,
– In the second case, there is a query with the input (C = (C5,C6,C7), tint, teph j)
such that oracle queries to H6 with different inputs X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6
return C7.
As H6 is modeled as a random oracle, the probability Pr[Evn] is negligible. Let
δ1 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in Game1.
Therefore, we have |δ1 − δ0| ≤ 1 = Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Before moving forward, we first describe the following claim. The verifica-
tion of this claim can be done straightforwardly in the random oracle model
given the encryption schemes E1 and E2 are one-way permutations.
Claim. Before the adversary queries SKU, given an E-type Retrieve query with
the input (C′ = (C′
5
,C′
6
,C′
7
),TStint , tephi), given that C
′ is not the output of a D-
type Retrieve query, then the probability C′
1
= C∗
1
is negligible, where Y =
Decrypt1(C′5, SK
(1)
tephi
) and C′
1
||C′2||C
′
3||C
′
4
= H9(Y) ⊕ C′6.
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game1
except for the following. Before the adversary queries SKU, for any E-type
Retrieve query with the input (C′ = (C′
5
,C′
6
,C′
7
),TStint , tephi), the challenger rejects
the request ifC′
1
= C∗
1
,whereY = Decrypt1(C′5, SK
(1)
tephi
) andC′
1
||C′2||C
′
3||C
′
4
= H9(Y)⊕
C′
6
, and C′ is not one of the output of D-type Retrieve queries.
Let δ2 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in
Game2. From the above claim, we have |δ2 − δ1| = 2 is negligible.
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game2
except for the following. Before the adversary queries SKU, for any E-type
Retrieve query with the input (C′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7),TStint , tephi), the challenger re-
turns T ∈R {0, 1}n if C′1 = C
∗
1
where Y = Decrypt1(C′5, SK
(1)
tephi
) and C′
1
||C′2||C
′
3||C
′
4
=
H9(Y) ⊕ C′6, and C
′ is one of the output of D-type Retrieve queries.
The game Game3 is identical to Game2 unless the following event Evn
occurs: For some aforementioned E-type Retrieve oracle query with the in-
put (C′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7),TStint , tephi), the adversary has queried H8 with the input
Y||C′
1
||C′
2
||C′
3
||C′
4
. As the encryption scheme E2 is one-way permutation and the
hash functions are random oracles, the probability Pr[Evn] is negligible. Let δ3
be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in Game3.
Therefore, we have |δ3 − δ2| ≤ 3 = Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Game4: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game3
except for answering the Retrieve oracle queries.
– Before the adversary queries SKU, given an E-type Retrieve query with the
input (C′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7),TStint , tephi), if C
′
1
, C∗
1
where Y = Decrypt1(C′5, SK
(1)
tephi
)
and C′
1
||C′
2
||C′
3
||C′
4
= H9(Y) ⊕ C′6, the challenger first checks whether or not
there is an query
Y˜||C˜′
1
||C˜′
2
||C˜′
3
||C˜′
4
||C˜′
5
||C˜′
6
to the oracle H7 such that
C′5 = Encrypt1(Y˜,PK
(1)
tephi
), C′6 = C˜
′
6
, (12)
H9(Y˜) ⊕ C′6 = C˜′1||C˜
′
2
||C˜′
3
||C˜′
4
, and C′7 = H7(Y˜||C˜′1||C˜
′
2
||C˜′
3
||C˜′
4
||C˜′
5
||C˜′
6
). (13)
If the input exists, the challenger proceeds. If eˆ(C˜′
3
, g) , eˆ(C˜′
1
,H4(C˜′1||C˜
′
2
)), it
aborts; otherwise it returns C
′′
, where
C
′′
= H8(Y˜||C˜′1||C˜
′
2
||C˜′
3
||C˜′
4
) ⊕ C˜′
4
⊕ H3(eˆ(PK(0)E ,H2(PK
(0)
tephi
))r˜
′
1 · eˆ(TStint , C˜
′
2
)).
Note that the challenger retrieves r˜′
1
such that gr˜
′
1 = C˜′
1
.
Let δ4 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in
Game4. The game Game4 is identical to Game3 unless the following event Evn
occurs in answering the E-type Retrieve oracle queries.
– In the secondcase, there is aquerywith the input (C′ = (C′
5
,C′
6
,C′
7
),TStint , tephi)
such that an oracle query to H7 with the input Y˜||C˜′1||C˜
′
2
||C˜′
3
||C˜′
4
||C˜′
5
||C˜′
6
(these
values are determined by the equalities (12) and (13)) returns C′
7
, while the
C′7 is chosen before the oracle query is made. Or,
– In the secondcase, there is aquerywith the input (C′ = (C′
5
,C′
6
,C′
7
),TStint , tephi)
such that oracle queries to H7 with different inputs Y˜||C˜′1||C˜
′
2
||C˜′
3
||C˜′
4
||C˜′
5
||C˜′
6
return C′
7
.
As H7 is modeled as a random oracle, the probability Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Let δ4 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b
′ = b in
Game4. Therefore, we have |δ4 − δ3| ≤ 4 = Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Game5: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game4
except that the challenge Cb is computed as follows.
r∗1, r
∗
2 ∈R Zp, X
∗ ∈R X, R ∈ G1, C
∗
1 = g
r∗1 , C∗2 = g
r∗2 , C∗3 = H4(C∗1||C
∗
2)
r∗1 ,
C∗4 =Mb ⊕ H3(R), C
∗
5 = Encrypt2(X∗,PKU), C∗6 = H5(X∗) ⊕ (C∗1||C∗2||C∗3||C∗4),
C∗7 = H6(X∗||C∗1||C
∗
2||C
∗
3||C
∗
4||C
∗
5||C
∗
6), Cb = (C
∗
5,C
∗
6,C
∗
7).
Let δ5 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in
Game5. As R ∈R G1, the equation |δ5 − 12 | = 0 holds.
With respect to the generation of Cb, from Game4 to Game5, the only mod-
ification is that eˆ(H2(IDE||tephi),C∗1)
SK(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),C
∗
2
)SKT has been replaced
with R, where R ∈R G1. As a result, Game5 is identical to Game4 unless
eˆ(H2(IDE||tephi),C∗1)
SK
(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),C
∗
2)
SKT has been queried to H3. Note that
SK
(0)
E
is not required in answering the oracle queries. We immediately obtain
|δ5 − δ4| ≤ 5 which is negligible based on the BDH assumption.
In summary, we have |δ0−δ5| =  ≤ 1+2+3+4+5. which are negligible.
As a result,  is negligible, and the lemma now follows. uunionsq
Lemma 3. The proposed scheme achieves semantic security against Type-III adversary
in the random oracle model given that the public key encryption schemes E1 and E2 are
one-way permutation.
Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary A has the advantage  in the attack game
depicted in Figure 3.
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol exe-
cution and answers the oracle queries from A. Note that the challenge Cb is
computed as follows.
r∗1, r
∗
2 ∈R Zp, X
∗ ∈R X, C
∗
1 = g
r∗
1 , C∗2 = g
r∗2 , C∗3 = H4(C∗1||C
∗
2)
r∗
1 ,
C∗4 =Mb ⊕ H3(eˆ(H2(IDE||tephi),C
∗
1)
SK
(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),C
∗
2)
SKT ),
C∗5 = Encrypt2(X∗,PKU), C∗6 = H5(X∗) ⊕ (C∗1||C∗2||C∗3||C∗4),
C∗7 = H6(X∗||C∗1||C
∗
2||C
∗
3||C
∗
4||C
∗
5||C
∗
6), Cb = (C
∗
5,C
∗
6,C
∗
7).
Let δ0 = Pr[b′ = b], as we assumed at the beginning, |δ0 −
1
2 | = .
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game0
except for the following. Given a D-type Retrieve query with the input (C =
(C5,C6,C7), tint, teph j), the challenger answers as the following.
1. In step 4 of the game, if C = Cb, the challenger returns C
′, where
M′ ∈R {0, 1}
n, C′1 = C
∗
1, C
′
2 = C
∗
2, C
′
3 = C
∗
3, C
′
4 =M
′ ⊕ C∗4,
Y ∈R Y, C
′
5 = Encrypt1(Y,PK
(1)
tephj
), C′6 = H9(Y) ⊕ (C
′
1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4),
C′7 = H7(Y||C
′
1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4||C
′
5||C
′
6), C
′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7).
2. Otherwise, the challenger first checks whether or not there is a query with
the input
X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6
to the oracle H6 such that
C5 = Encrypt2(X˜,PKU), C6 = C˜6, (14)
H5(X˜) ⊕ C6 = C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4, and C7 = H6(X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6). (15)
If the input exists, the challenger returns C′, where
M′ ∈R {0, 1}
n, C′1 = C˜1, C
′
2 = C˜2, C
′
3 = C˜3, C
′
4 =M
′ ⊕ C˜4,
C′5 = Encrypt1(Y,PK
(1)
tephj
), C′6 = H9(Y) ⊕ (C′1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4),
C′7 = H7(Y||C′1||C
′
2||C
′
3||C
′
4||C
′
5||C
′
6), C
′ = (C′5,C
′
6,C
′
7).
Otherwise, the challenger rejects the quest.
The game Game1 is identical to Game0 unless the following event Evn occurs
in answering the D-type Retrieve oracle queries.
– In the second case, there is a query with the input (C = (C5,C6,C7), tint, teph j)
such that an oracle query to H6 with the input X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6 (these
values are determined by the equalities (14) and (15)) returns C7, while the
C7 is chosen before the oracle query is made. Or,
– In the second case, there is a query with the input (C = (C5,C6,C7), tint, teph j)
such that oracle queries to H6 with different inputs X˜||C˜1||C˜2||C˜3||C˜4||C˜5||C˜6
return C7.
As H6 is modeled as a random oracle, the probability Pr[Evn] is negligible. Let
δ1 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b
′ = b in Game1.
Therefore, we have |δ1 − δ0| ≤ 1 = Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game1
except that the challenge Cb is computed as follows.
r∗1, r
∗
2 ∈R Zp, X
∗,X† ∈R X, C
∗
1 = g
r∗
1 , C∗2 = g
r∗2 , C∗3 = H4(C∗1||C
∗
2)
r∗
1 ,
C∗4 =Mb ⊕ H3(eˆ(H2(PK
(0)
tephi
),PK(0)
E
)r
∗
1 · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),PKT)
r∗
2)
=Mb ⊕ H3(eˆ(H2(IDE||tephi),C∗1)
SK
(0)
E · eˆ(H1(IDT||t∗int),C
∗
2)
SKT ),
C∗5 = Encrypt2(X†,PKU), C∗6 = H5(X∗) ⊕ (C∗1||C∗2||C∗3||C∗4),
C∗7 = H6(X
∗||C∗1||C
∗
2||C
∗
3||C
∗
4||C
∗
5||C
∗
6), Cb = (C
∗
5,C
∗
6,C
∗
7).
The game Game2 is identical to Game1 unless the following event Evn occurs:
the adversary queries H5 with 0||X† or H6 with 0||X†|| ∗ || ∗ || ∗ || ∗ || ∗ ||∗. As E2 is
one-way and H5,H6 are random oracles, the probability Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Let δ2 be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in
Game2. Therefore, we have |δ2 − δ1| ≤ 2 = Pr[Evn] is negligible.
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game3
except that the challenge Cb is computed as follows.
r∗1, r
∗
2 ∈R Zp, X
∗,X† ∈R X, R ∈ G1, C
∗
1 = g
r∗1 , C∗2 = g
r∗2 , C∗3 = H4(C∗1||C
∗
2)
r∗1 ,
C∗4 =Mb ⊕ H3(R), C
∗
5 = Encrypt2(X†,PKU), C∗6 = H5(X∗) ⊕ (C∗1||C∗2||C∗3||C∗4),
C∗7 = H6(X
∗||C∗1||C
∗
2||C
∗
3||C
∗
4||C
∗
5||C
∗
6), Cb = (C
∗
5,C
∗
6,C
∗
7).
Regardless of the change, the game Game3 is identical to Game2 as X∗ ∈R X
and H5,H6 are random oracles. Let δ3 be the probability that the challenger
successfully ends and b′ = b in Game3. As R ∈R G1, the equation |δ2 − 12 | =
|δ3 −
1
2 | = 0 holds.
In summary, we have |δ0 − δ3| =  ≤ 1 + 2. which are negligible. As a result,
 is negligible, and the lemma now follows. uunionsq
6 Further Remarks
In this section,wecompare the conceptsofEphemerizer (andTimed-Ephemerizer)
with that of Vanish. We also present an application of Timed-Ephemerizer in an
outsourcing scenario.
6.1 A Comparison to Vanish
Geambasu et al. [6] claim that Vanish is superior to Ephemerizer (and Timed-
Ephemerizer) in the sense that the latter requires the Ephemerizer to be trusted
for securely delete the expired ephemeral private keys. In contrast, with Vanish,
the user needs to trust the P2P network in the sense that a certain proportion of
the nodes would not be seized by the adversary. This trust assumption seems
valid, however, there is no guarantee.
With respect to P2P nodes, it is impossible to precisely determine the time
period that a threshold subset of nodes stay in the network. Therefore, there is
no precise guarantee on the expiration time of the sensitive data. There are two
concerns here.
1. One is that the P2P nodes leave the network sooner than expected, which
means that the sensitive data will become unrecoverable or unavailable
when they are needed. This shortcoming has been noted in [6], and a state-
ment is explicitly made that Vanish is suitable to protect sensitive data, for
which the user cares more about privacy than its availability.
2. The other is that the P2P nodes leave the network later than expected,which
means that the sensitive data remains recoverable or available when they
should have been deleted. In this case, extra action should be taken to delete
the private key shares and make the sensitive data unrecoverable.
In contrast,with Ephemerizer andTimed-Ephemerizer, precise guarantee on the
expiration timeof sensitivedata is guaranteed, and the availability is guaranteed
as long as the Ephemerizer (and the time server) are available.
With respect to the availability of data, the other concern is DoS and DDoS
attacks. With Vanish, the user needs to retrieve the key shares from a threshold
subset of P2P nodes in order to recover the symmetric key. In practice, a P2P
network is easily subjected to DoS and DDoS attacks [11,16], so isVanish. Facing
DoS and DDoS attacks, the availability of the protected data could be a problem
for the underlying applications. For Ephemerizer (and Timed-ephemerizer),
the Ephemerizer (and the time server) will be well protected because they
are dedicated (commercial) entities for providing the services. The adversary
may still try to mount DoS and DDoS attacks, but, the risks will be much less
compared with that facing Vanish.
In summary, Ephemerizer (and Timed-Ephemerizer) can provide assured
lifecycle where the guarantees are precise and provable from the perspective of
security. In contrast, Vanish sacrifices availability for security, while the security
guarantee relies on the underlying P2P network. Ephemerizer (and Timed-
Ephemerizer) need dedicated third parties, namely the Ephemerizer and the
time server, in order to provide the service. This additional infrastructure re-
quirement may be regarded as a disadvantage, however, the complexity is paid
back by the assured lifecycle and availability of sensitive data.
6.2 Application Example: Outsourcing Data Security
As an example, we consider the following data management problem in out-
sourcing activities.
Suppose Alice and Bob have signed an outsourcing contract, in which
Alice wants to outsource part of her business to Bob. Suppose also that,
during the outsourcing process, Bob needs to frequently access a large
amount of Alice’s private data. In this scenario, in order to protect the
confidentiality of Alice’s data, Alice and Bob need to deploy an efficient
protocol which makes Alice’s data available to Bob during the contract
period and unrecoverable after the contract ends.
There exists two straightforward solutions, referred to asOn-demand transfer
and Direct encryption.
– On-demand transfer: This solution is that, Bob requests the data from Alice
whenever needed and deletes them immediately afterwards. Clearly, this
solution may introduce terrible communication complexity. In addition, for
each request, Alice needs to authenticate Bob before granting the access.
– Direct encryption: This solution is asking Bob to encrypt and store Alice’s
data during the contract period and delete the data after the contract ends.
However, clearly, this solution will put Alice’s data in danger if Bob fails to
securely delete the data after the contract ends.
With a Timed-Ephemerizer protocol, we have the following solution to solve
the above problem.
1. Alice encrypts her data using a symmetric key K and runs the Generate al-
gorithm to encapsulateK.Without loss of generality, suppose the ciphertexts
are CM and CK respectively. Alice lets Bob store CM and CK.
2. When Bob needs to recover the data, he runs the Timed-Ephemerizer proto-
col, more specifically the Retrieve algorithm, to retrieve the symmetric key
K. With K, Bob can recovers the data from CM.
If we assume the plaintext data will only reside in Bob’s volatile storage
devices, Alice’s data will be unrecoverable after the underlying ephemeral key
pair has expired and been securely deleted by the Ephemerizer. In addition,
Alice can set an initial disclosure time for her data. In practice, the Ephemer-
izer and the time server can be dedicated (and commercial) organizations (like
Verisign being as a CA) that serve many users. Compared with the On-demand
transfer solution, the current solution requires lower communication complex-
ity since only a symmetric key needs to be retrieved; while, compared with
Direct encryption solution, the current solution provides stronger guarantee that
expired data will be unrecoverable.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we revisited the concept of Ephemerizer, proposed by Perlman,
and show that some existing ephemerizer protocols possess vulnerabilities. We
then formalized the notion of Timed-Ephemerizer, aimed to provide an assured
lifecycle for sensitive data, and proposed a new Timed-Ephemerizer protocol
and proved its security in the proposed security model. For this new concept of
Timed-Ephemerizer, a number of interesting research questions remain open.
We list two of them here. One is to investigate more efficient and secure proto-
cols for Timed-Ephemerizer. Especially, note that the random oracle paradigm
has been heavily used in the security analysis of the proposed protocol. It is
interesting to design secure protocols without using random oracles. The other
interesting research question is to use Timed-Ephemerizer as a tool to solve
practical security problems. Note that, as an application of Ephemerizer, Perl-
man [13] proposes a file system that supports high availability of data with
assured delete.
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